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1. Introduction 
 
Most human actions can be explained in terms of reasons. To explain why I did something I 
will normally be able to give my reasons that I had in favour of so acting at the time of acting. 
There will typically be a reason or reasons that motivated me to do what I did. I can also have 
reasons why I should do something, for example moral reasons, and these reasons ought to be 
capable of becoming my reasons for which I actually do something.  
In my thesis I will explore what it means to act for a reason and what kind of entities reasons 
are. The main current dispute on the nature of reasons is that between the psychologist view 
and the factualist view. The first states that actions should be explained in terms of the agent’s 
psychological states such as beliefs and desires and the latter is a position that actions should 
be explained in terms of facts of the world. To shortly illustrate the essential difference 
between these two positions (without yet having any specific theories in mind) let us imagine 
that I will paint my room. According to the psychologist view my reason for this action would 
be some mental state or a combination of mental states of mine. It could be that I desire a 
freshly painted room and I believe that certain actions like buying paint and painting the wall 
will help me achieve what I desire. Or I might believe that the room should be painted (my 
belief) and this belief brings about a desire to buy some paint and paint the walls. On the 
factualist view my reason could be that the wall needs a fresh coat of paint or that the old 
colour of the wall is too boring (a fact), but not my being in a mental state. According to 
factualism mental states can be reasons for action only in rare cases and only as facts (the fact 
that I believe something, but not being in the state of believing).  When asked to explain why 
I just painted my wall, I would not respond that I believed that the wall looked boring before 
or that I desired to paint the wall. Rather I would say  that my reason was that the wall looked 
boring. I will discuss what speaks in favour of either view and what conclusions about 
normative and motivating reasons follow from them.  
The question about the nature of reasons is a fascinating and fundamental question about the 
structure of human motivation and actions. So one of my main interests is a theoretical one: 
how we can explain why someone did what she did, what does it mean to have reasons and 
how reasons belong to agents. A second and more practical question is about how reasons 
why I should act can be reasons why I do act.  
In section 2 I will define the main concepts of reason theory which will be used in my thesis 
and I will give a short overview of the essential idea of the psychologist and the factualist 
theory of reasons. The main discussion in my thesis is divided into two sections: in section 3 I 
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will analyze competing psychologist theories of reasons and in section 4 I will analyze the 
factualist theory of reasons. In section 3.1 I will discuss the desire-based psychologist theory 
of reasons and in sections 3.2 and 3.3 I will show how it has been opposed to within the 
psychologist tradition. In section 3.4 I will discuss Donald Davidson’s view that reasons 
(which are psychological states of the agent) must explain actions causally as well as 
rationally. Finally, in the last section of psychologism, I will analyze Thomas Nagel’s theory 
of reasons and will argue that it should be understood as a hybrid view rather than as a  
psychologist view of reasons as has been suggested by some philosophers, including Eric 
Wiland in his book “Reasons”. In section 4.1 I am going to reconstruct Jonathan Dancy’s 
factualist theory. I will consider its possible advantages over psychologism and its 
characteristical possible shortcomings as pointed out by the supporters of psychologism. In 
section 4.2 I will discuss Michael Smith’s arguments against factualism and Dancy’s reply to 
his criticism. In section 5 I will compare Dancy’s factualism with Nagel’s hybrid view and 
analyze the role of mental states in the factualist picture of reasons. 
 I will defend the factualist view and show that being in mental states does not play the role of 
reasons in the explanation of actions. Instead mental states should be understood as enabling 
conditions for having motivating reasons for acting or in some cases as facts in the light of 
which we act. I will argue that the factualist framework of reasons allows mental states to be 
our reasons as facts more often than it has been argued by Jonathan Dancy  whose theory of 
factualism will be the basis of my discussion of factualism. 
Eventually, I would like to thank my supervisor Francesco Orsi, whose recommendations on 
the choice of literature were of great help and with whom I had discussions during the process 
of writing my thesis that were especially inspiring and constructive. 
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2. Definitions 
 
In this section I will explain the key concepts of theories of reasons as used in my thesis. I 
will also give a short and general overview of the essential ideas that factualism and 
psychologism are based on. All defined concepts are typed in italics.  
Two sorts of reasons can be distinguished: motivating reasons and normative, i.e. good 
reasons. The first kind of reasons are to be understood in the sense of reasons why someone 
acted as she did: what were the agent’s reasons at the time of acting for so acting. Motivating 
reasons are explanatory reasons. When I write about motivating reasons I am referring to 
agent’s reasons only. We can also say that the reason why someone so acted was that she was 
shy or that she was tired, which are not the reasons in the light of which one could act and 
therefore not the agent’s reasons. Although they also explain actions, they can rather be 
understood as causes.  Normative reasons (which I will also refer to as good reasons) are 
reasons the agent has in favour of acting (even if she is unaware of having these reasons), they 
justify action. Normative reasons make sense of claims that someone should act in one way or 
another. In Dancy’s picture, (which I will discuss in sect. 4.1) these reasons are not different 
in kind. So-called Humeans (defenders of a psychologist view, discussed in sect. 3.1, which is 
known as the Humean view although it is not necessarily one that Hume advocated) also 
believe that normative and motivating reasons are constituted by the same sort of thing – 
namely desires. The unificationist models of reasons claim that normative and motivating 
reasons are the same kind of entities. Separationist models, on the other hand, understand 
normative reasons and motivating reasons as different kind of entities. So unificationists are 
either psychologists or factualists about both reasons, while separationists can be 
psychologists (or defend a mix of psychologism and factualism) about one sort of reasons and 
be factualists about other sort of reasons. 
A successful theory of reasons should meet three constraints: explanatory constraint, 
normative constraint and ownership constraint. The explanatory constraint is that a successful 
theory of reasons should show how reasons explain actions they are reasons for. The 
normative constraint  requires that a theory of reasons must be able to explain how reasons 
that justify our actions can be our motivating reasons. This constraint is that a theory of 
reasons must show how reasons why we should do something can also be the reasons why we 
actually do it, i.e. it should show how normative reasons can be motivating reasons.  The 
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ownership constraint is that a theory of reasons should describe how reasons belong to the 
person whose reasons they are.  
The psychologist theory of reasons is the view that reasons are, or are grounded in, our mental 
states. We have truth-apt mental states and non-truth-apt mental states. Our beliefs relate to 
the world by representing the world as it is. Beliefs can be either true or false depending on 
what is true or false of the world they represent. Desires are directed at changing the way the 
world is. I will sometimes also use the term pro-attitudes which stands for any other mental 
states with the same direction of fit as desires such as yens, drives, hopes, etc. These attitudes 
should be distinguished from desires although they have the same direction of fit. For 
instance, I may desire things that I hope will not occur. I may desire to fall asleep and yet 
hope that I won’t because I need to finish reading a book. According to certain philosophers, 
including Donald Davidson, also evaluative beliefs count as pro-attitudes. These also can be 
distinguished from desires: I may believe I should get some exercise without desiring to do it. 
But when I do get some exercise, my belief that I should might well play the role of a pro-
attitude.  
When I desire to have a blue balloon, my desire cannot be true or false depending on any 
actual state of affairs, while my beliefs can be true if they represent the world as it is, or false 
if they fail to do so. Desires and pro-attitudes either motivate or are states of being motivated. 
If I desire to get a blue balloon then I am motivated, at least to some extent, to do what is 
needed to get a blue balloon. I will use Nagel’s distinction between motivated and 
unmotivated desires. The former are arrived at by rational deliberation or motivated by further 
desires, the latter simply come to us without any further beliefs or desires having brought 
them about.   
According to all psychologist views our reasons are grounded in our psychological states but 
there is disagreement between defenders of psychologism about what role exactly desires and 
beliefs play in forming reasons and whether either sort of mental state is necessary or/ and 
sufficient for having a reason for action. Our actions can be explained in terms of our 
cognitive mental states alone (the belief-alone model) or some combination of cognitive and 
non-cognitive mental states. 
According to factualism, there are grounds for thinking that psychologism in any form is 
incorrect. Regarding normative reasons, factualists generally point out that mental states do 
not normally provide good reasons. They may function as reasons in odd cases. For example 
if Byron believes that the government is spying on his every move without any considerable 
evidence, this does not give him a reason to hide from the mailman, but it does give him a 
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reason to seek help from a counselor. In this case his psychological state is the consideration 
in the light of which he should see a psychiatrist. Most reasons, however, are not like that. 
What typically justifies action is not our beliefs about the world but, if anything, what our 
beliefs are about. So in this view reasons are typically not psychological after all. Jonathan 
Dancy argues that the belief-alone model of psychologism fails to meet the normative 
constraint. Only facts can be normative and since beliefs (or being in the state of believing) 
are not facts they cannot be normative reasons. As regards desires as normative reasons, 
factualists generally rely on arguments against desire-based theories of reasons that may be 
common to non-desire-based (or anti-Humean) forms of psychologism. 
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3. Psychologism 
 
3.1 The Humean view and arguments: desire-based theory of reasons 
 
The most prominent form of psychologism is the so-called Humean or desire-based theory. 
This is not necessarily one that David Hume advocated but an interpretation and/or expansion 
of his analysis of human motivation. Thus the desire-based view is often referred to as the 
Humean view. 
On this view beliefs are inert states that cannot by themselves motivate, so desire (or some 
other sentiment) is needed for the agent to be motivated to act. Beliefs and desires are mental 
states with different directions of fit. (Anscombe 1957: sect. 32; Smith 1987: 54) Beliefs have 
to fit with the world they represent, while the world has to fit with the desires. Beliefs are 
‘satisfied’ (i.e. true) when they fit with the world, desires are satisfied when the world fits 
with them. In this sense, desire, but not belief, aims at changing the world. So according to 
Humeanism beliefs alone are wrong kind of things to explain action and therefore cannot be 
reasons for our actions. Desires alone cannot make sense of an action either and desire-based 
views of reasons don’t usually argue that desires are reasons, rather they are necessary for 
having reasons. To explain an action a means-end belief is usually necessary. I may desire to 
have a cup of tea, but this alone does not explain why I put the teapot on stove. I need to 
believe that in order to get some tea, I have to boil water first. The Humean view is a 
psychologist explanation of action. My reason for boiling water is explained in terms of my 
desire to drink tea and my belief that I need boiled water for it (Davidson 1963: 686-687). 
Those who defend the belief-desire model of explaining actions, argue that beliefs alone are 
not the kind of things that could explain action and thus all belief-alone models fail to meet 
the explanatory constraint. The supporters of belief-desire models usually argue that beliefs 
alone cannot motivate and thus cannot be our reasons for action. For example, I could have a 
belief that a certain school would provide me with good education but I must also care for 
good education to be motivated to study in named school. The Humean view is that desires 
motivate us and that, therefore, they play a necessary and more fundamental part in forming 
reasons, both motivating reasons and normative reasons. 
Some critics of the Humean view, e.g. Dancy, argue that desire is the state of being motivated, 
and therefore desire cannot be the source of all motivation. Nagel distinguishes unmotivated 
and motivated desires and argues that some desires are motivated by something further (which 
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can but doesn’t have to be always a further desire) and therefore sometimes we have reasons 
that are not desires. 
The belief-desire model can also be criticized on the basis that it allows one to only have 
reasons for doing things that one already wants to do. If this is the case, however, it would 
appear impossible to say that there is reason for the agent to perform a courageous act if  she 
doesn’t happen to want to act courageously. 
 
 
3.2 Pure cognitivism 
 
Although Jonathan Dancy eventually rejects all forms of psychologism, he argues in his book 
“Moral Reasons” (1993) for cognitivism and suggests in his “Practical Reality” (2000) that 
the best form of psychologism is one that accepts only beliefs (and not desires) as reasons. He 
calls this view pure cognitivism. This theory is constructed to criticize Humeanism. Pure 
cognitivism is a view that desire can never be what motivates because desire is the state of 
being motivated. Therefore the desire itself also needs to be explained if we want to give a 
full explanation of an action. A pure cognitivist would say that instead we have two beliefs 
which together are capable of motivating and explain our motivated actions: a belief about 
how things are and a belief about how things would be if the action were successfully 
performed. Desires can be explained via such beliefs. When I desire to feed my friend’s cat 
while he is on a vacation my desire  can be explained by my several beliefs about how things 
are and how they would be if I fed the cat. Among my reason-giving beliefs about how things 
are could be that his cat cannot get any food by itself, that I like cats, that it is morally good 
and/or required to help one’s friends and to take care of animals who are domesticated, etc. 
My beliefs about how things would be if I fed his cat, could be that the cat will be taken good 
care of, that I will enjoy taking care of the cat, and I will have done what is right and/or my 
duty. Together these beliefs make sense of my desire to feed the cat. My desire is not a reason 
why I feed my cat, instead my beliefs are reasons both to desire to feed the cat and to feed the 
cat. These two beliefs motivate both desire and action, because desire is the state of being 
motivated, desire itself does not motivate anything.  (Dancy 2000: 13-14) 
 
„Pure cognitivism [---] supposes that a complete motivating state can consist of nothing but cognitive states. It 
allows that, where there is motivation, there will be desire. But it understands the desire as the state of being 
motivated rather than as some part of what motivates.“ (Dancy 2000: 85) 
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However, there are some unmotivated desires that I simply have with no further reasons. In 
this case, according to Dancy, my action simply cannot be explained in terms of reasons. 
Strictly speaking, there was no reason to act, I was motivated to act without a reason. (When 
we explain actions in terms of reasons, we do not have in mind just any sort of motivation but 
‘rational motivation’). 
 
 „Some desires, of course, cannot be explained. But if they cannot be explained, then neither can the action that, 
in desiring as we do, we are motivated to perform. If we cannot say why we want to do it, the fact that we want 
to do it offers nothing by way of explanation for the action.“ (Dancy 2000: 85) 
 
Dancy reconstructs Michael Smith’s Humean view and argues that it does not show that 
desires are motivating reasons. To desire is (1) to have a desire and (2) (cases of 
unexplainable desires aside) it is to have a motivating reason, but it does not follow that 
desires are motivating reasons. For if the second claim is rephrased as „to desire is to be 
motivated by some conception of how things are“ it becomes clear that the desire can be 
further explained and is not itself the fundamental explanation of action. Here are the 
premises of Smith’s argument: 
(a) Having a motivating reason is having a goal. 
(b) Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit. 
(c) Being in a state with which the world must fit is desiring. 
This does not bring us to a conclusion that desires are motivating reasons, but rather that 
having a motivating reason is desiring. (Dancy 2000: 91) 
The pure cognitivist model, therefore, rejects the Humean picture of beliefs as inert mental 
states: beliefs are fit to get us into a state of motivatedness, i.e. a state of desire. On the other 
hand, it agrees, at least verbally, with the idea that desire is a necessary component of a 
complete explanation of action. Yet, only what we believe and what we want can be a 
motivating reason. 
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3.3 Motivated desires and unmotivated desires 
 
Thomas Nagel’s model of reasons also requires the rejection of the Humean picture. His 
model is more complicated and it can be understood as a separationist view. He seems to 
claim that our motivating reasons can be both psychologist and factualist, while our normative 
reasons are exclusively factualist (values). Nagel distinguishes between two sorts of desires: 
motivated and unmotivated desires. Motivated desires are arrived at by decision and after 
rational deliberation or motivated by further desires, unmotivated desires simply come to us 
without deliberation, although they can be explained. According to Nagel the claim that desire 
underlies every action is true only if desires are taken to include motivated as well as 
unmotivated desires. (Nagel 1978: 28) 
My reason to act can be my unmotivated desire so to act. But my reason to act can also be the 
result of my rational deliberation and while desire is still present in this case (as the state of 
being motivated), the reason for my desire is the same as the reason for acting. Therefore the 
result of rational deliberation, namely a belief that I should act in a certain way, can be a 
reason for action. It might be argued that every reason still originates in a desire. My belief 
that I will get my BA degree in philosophy if I write my thesis, will motivate me to write it, 
but only if I already have a desire to get a degree in philosophy. The belief-desire model 
suggests that this is the case with all reasons, but Nagel argues that it can be different at least 
in case of some reasons, such as moral reasons. 
He defends the validity of this statement by saying that sometimes action and the desire to 
perform that action can be motivated by the same reasons. Therefore the desire to perform the 
action obviously cannot always be among reasons for performing it. (Nagel 1978: 30) 
Nagel also argues that we make a similar mistake when we take a logical consequence of a 
belief we already have to be a condition for having that very same belief. Nagel gives an 
example of using principles of logic: if someone draws conclusions in accordance with a 
principle of logic then it is approriate to ascribe to him the belief that this principle is true. 
Both, his belief that this principle is true and his drawing conclusions in accordance with it, 
are explained by the same reason. (Nagel 1978: 31) 
What Nagel seems to be saying is that if I have a reason to believe something, then that reason 
explains both why I believe something and why I believe that that was indeed a reason for 
believing it. Suppose I believe that p is true, and I also believe that if p is true, then q follows. 
On this basis, I come to believe that q is true. Now, it is also true that, if I reason this way, it is 
because I believe in the validity of my reasoning: I believe that, if one believes that p, and 
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also believes that if p then q, then she must also believe that q. But the fact that I have this 
belief about correct reasoning is not among my reasons for believing that q. Likewise, in the 
practical case, my (motivated) desire to do x when I do x must be there (or I wouldn’t have 
done x), but is not among my reasons to do x. So, in cases like these, my belief or desire in 
question cannot be amongst my reasons. „Beliefs provide the material for theoretical 
reasoning, but finally there is something besides belief, namely reason, which underlies our 
inferences from one set of beliefs to another.“ (Nagel 1978:  31) 
 
Nagel’s first objection  against the Humean view 
He argues that a desire or belief is always present when reasons motivate or convince. 
However, the desire is not always behind the motivation or provide a reason for it and a belief 
is not always behind the conclusion or provide a reason for it.  
„[---] desires are among the materials for practical reasoning, but ultimately something besides desire explains 
how reasons function“ (Nagel 78: 31). 
Nagel draws the conclusion that reasons may have the capacity of  motivating precisely 
because they are reasons and not because a motivationally influential factor is among their 
conditions of application. We don’t have reasons because we have desires (and beliefs) but 
the other way round, we have (motivated) desires (and beliefs) because we have reasons or at 
least because we think we do.  
 
„Some desires are themselves motivated by reasons. Those desires at any rate cannot be among the conditions of 
the reasons which motivate them. And since there may in principle be motivation without motivating desires, 
those reasons may be motivationally efficacious even without the presence of any further desires among their 
conditions.“ (Nagel 1978: 32) 
 
Latter is the key claim against a Humean view, which defends the model of reasons where 
there is a further desire behind every belief that might motivate us to act. Nagel believes that 
there may be in principle motivation without motivating desires as conditions for being 
motivated. It could be begging the question against the Humeans by simply denying their 
fundamental claim. However, if Nagel could show that there are cases where there is no 
further desire behind motivation, except for the desire which is given rise by further beliefs or 
values that the agent has, then his argument would place the burden on Humeans.  
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Nagel’s second objection against the Humean view:  
The soft-drink machine example 
Nagel claims that his position provides us with a better way of rendering the motivation of 
actions intelligible. Desire is always present, but sometimes (perhaps more often than not) not 
as a condition for being motivated but rather as a consequence of having reasons to act. To 
desire is not a necessary condition for being motivated in the sense that this mental state has 
to pre-exist for the agent to be motivated. It can pre-exist in the case of unmotivated desires 
but otherwise it is always present in the sense that it will exist as a state of being motivated as 
a consequence of having reasons for action.  
My wanting to feed a dime to a soft-drink machine is motivated by my thirst. Thirst can be 
seen as It is an unmotivated desire to drink. I need not rationally deliberate to arrive at the 
conclusion that I want to drink, nor to generate such a desire. (I am not saying that any desire 
to drink must be an unmotivated desire. I may desire to drink because the doctor told me to 
drink more: in this case it would be a motivated desire to drink.) So my desire to feed the 
machine a dime is a motivated desire and my thirst is an unmotivated desire. In this case my 
action is explained in terms of a desire motivated by an unmotivated desire plus the 
information that feeding a soft-drink machine a dime will provide me with a can of soda. 
Nagel then shows that we should not conclude  that desire always provides the agent with a 
reason or even that it motivates the action. 
 It is possible to imagine that thirst should cause me to want to put a dime into my pencil 
sharpener. My unmotivated desire D¹ causes me to have another desire D². However, Nagel 
claims that it would be obscure to say that I have a reason to do it, or even that thirst 
motivates me to do it. So according to Nagel, any desire-based theory renders intelligible 
some actions that are, in fact, not. 
 
„[---] it is imaginable that thirst should cause me to want to put a dime in my pencil sharpener, but this would be 
an obscure compulsion or the product of malicious conditioning rather than a rational motivation. We should not 
say that thirst provided me with a reason to do such a thing, or even that thirst had motivated me to do it. A 
theory of motivation is defective if it renders intelligible behaviour which is not intelligible. If we explain the 
ordinary cases of adopting means to a desired end in terms of an additional desire or an extension of the original 
one, then we must allow a similar explanation for counter-rational cases. But the fact is that such devices do not 
produce adequate motivational explanations of deranged behaviour. And if they do not yield adequate 
explanations in the peculiar case, there is reason to believe that their analogues are not the basis of intelligibility 
in the normal case. “ (Nagel 1978: 34) 
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This argument places an argumentative burden on the defenders of Humean model. However,  
someone who defends a Humean view could argue that in this case it is not the thirst that is 
the fundamental desire and a reason for action. Instead it could simply be the agent’s desire to 
put a dime into the pencil sharpener and this desire is her reason for doing so – surely not a 
good reason, but still an explanatory reason for her action. In this case Nagel’s example would 
not force Humeans to render intelligible actions that are not. They do not have to adopt the 
view that thirst is the reason to put a dime into a pencil sharpener and could nevertheless 
claim that the reason is a desire or urge. It would not be a desire to drink, but a desire to put a 
dime into the pencil sharpener. An agent may be thirsty and then suddenly feel an urge to put 
a dime into the pencil sharpener but it does not prove that one desire gives rise to the other at 
all. And if it does cause the desire to put a dime into the pencil sharpener, it could still be 
argued that when I do put a dime into the sharpener my reason to do it is the desire I now have 
and not my thirst. Not any desire that might cause my desires and actions needs to be among 
my reasons for the action, though it might help explain the action in non-rational terms. 
Nagel suggests a different explanation. He draws a distinction between actions that are caused 
and actions that are rationally motivated. His argument can be reformulated as follows: 
(a) My desire D² is caused by my unmotivated desire D¹. 
(b) My desire D¹ is not a reason why I have a desire D², i.e. D¹ does not rationally motivate 
D². 
The relation between my thirst and my desire to put a dime into my pencil sharpener cannot 
be explained in terms of reasons but it can be explained in terms of causes.  For Nagel there is 
a fundamental incompatibility between reasons and causes – a cause cannot be a reason. Next 
I will move onto Davidson who has argued the opposite: that reasons are, after all, just a one 
sort of causal explanations. 
 
 
3.4 Davidson’s view and arguments: reasons as causal explanations 
 
Davidson argues that although giving reasons why the agent acted is a rationalization of the 
action, rationalizations of this sort are simply a species of ordinary causal explanation. 
Whenever someone does something for a reason, she can be described as: 
(1) having a pro-attitude of some sort (desires, wantings, urges, goals, values, etc) of the 
agent, and (2) a belief that the action is of that kind (Davidson 1963: 686).  
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From the agent’s point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action.   
Davidson argues that if explanations of actions are simply justifications but not causal then 
something essential is left out. Namely a person can have a reason to perform an action, i.e. a 
pro-attitude + belief complex, and actually perform the action and yet not for this reason but 
for another. For example, if I help my friend I might have a reason to do it both because I 
think it is morally good and because I enjoy helping my friends. If I do it because I enjoy 
helping others, the fact that it is also morally good does not have to be the reason why I help 
my friend, even though it is a reason I have to help a friend. Therefore, it is essential that if a 
given reason is to explain the action it must be the reason why the agent in fact so acted, 
instead of just being one of the reasons he had for so acting. Davidson concludes that we need 
the notion of causal explanation to make such a distinction: motivating reasons which explain 
an action must also cause the action. (Davidson 1963: 691)   
 According to Davidson, when we explain an action in terms of  reasons, we are rationalizing 
the action from a third person’s point of view. Although reasons must make some sense from 
the agent’s point of view also, reasons must also explain the action as an event. They explain 
the action by giving causal explanation wherein the agent’s psychological states are causes.  
 
The paint-drinker’s example 
Davidson describes someone who has an urge to drink a can of paint. There is nothing good 
about drinking a can of paint even from the agent’s point of view, she just has a yen to drink 
it. Davidson claims that this is enough to say that the agent has a primary reason for acting.  
The yen to drink paint and the action of drinking it make rational sense together, while thirst 
does not rationalize putting a dime into a pencil sharpener, unless I have a crazy belief that 
this will somehow slake my thirst. An unmotivated urge to put a dime into a pencil sharpener 
would be a motivating primary reason for putting a dime into the pencil sharpener, however.    
When we give a causal explanation, we are explaining an event. When we give a rational 
explanation, we are explaining a rational action.  Davidson argues that when we give a 
rational explanation of the agent’s action, we are also giving a causal explanation, because 
reasons are causes for actions. This is where his view diverges from Nagel’s view, as Nagel 
denies this and argues that reasons and causes are different entities. 
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3.5 Nagel’s view as a hybrid of factualism and psychologism 
 
Eric Wiland suggests that Nagel’s position should be viewed as a psychologist model of 
reasons because: 
 
„It’s important to see that while Nagel attempts to demonstrate that desires need not explain rational action, he 
often writes as though beliefs still do. Since he thinks that beliefs rationally motivate action, there is a sense in 
which he thinks that beliefs are reasons. That is, on Nagel’s view, it makes perfect sense to say that the reason 
you are learning Italian now is that you believe that in six weeks you will be in Italy. And this makes it 
appropriate to view Nagel’s view as a version of psychologism.“ (Wiland 2012: 85) 
 
Dancy, however, seems to interpret Nagel’s view rather as a factualist view: 
 
„Nagel’s claim, by contrast, was that if we explain actions by appeal to the beliefs and desires of the agent , we 
will have to abandon any suggestion that agents act for reasons. We explain an intentional action by specifying 
the reasons that motivated the agent. So Nagel is claiming that if we adopt psychologism, we might as well give 
up talking about acting for a reason altogether.“ (Dancy 2000: 98) 
  
If desires are not really necessary for having a reason, the question arises whether beliefs, as 
psychological attitudes of another sort, are necessary either. Nagel discusses the cases of 
motivated desires using prudence and altruism as examples. He uses the term  prudence as 
future directed self-interest. His aim is to attack the Humean view on the basis that it allows 
our future interests to give us a reason to act now only if we presently have a desire to further 
those interests. Nagel’s argument can be reformulated as follows: 
(a) According to the Humean view future interests cannot provide us with good-reasons-now, 
unless we care about our future interests now (are motivated to take care of them now).  
(b) The agent cannot be motivated to take care of her future interests, unless she has presently 
a desire to do so.  
(c) If the agent has no desire to promote her future interests now, she wouldn’t  consequently 
have a reason to do so.  
(d) It would follow that the agent’s future interests by themselves cannot provide reasons for 
her now.  
This conclusion (d) is counterintuitive and Nagel rejects both (a) and (b). (Nagel 1978: pp. 39-
46) 
Consequently, if a person knew that she would desire her well-being in the future, this 
knowledge would provide her with no reasons to act in a way that would lead to her future 
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well-being, unless she had a desire to do so, now. Nagel argues that good reasons cannot be 
time-dependent in this way and if a person has reasons in the future they must count as 
reasons-now or must impose derivative reasons-now, as well. The person must be able to be 
motivated by those reasons, even if she has no desire to promote her future-interests now, or 
otherwise she is incapable of identifying with herself. 
 
„[---] the influence of reasons can extend over time, because there is reason to promote that for which there is or 
will be a reason.[---] the influence of reasons is transmitted over time because reasons represent values which are 
not time-dependent.“ (Nagel 1978: 45- 46)  
 
In the previous quotation Nagel clearly supports the view that at least some reasons are not 
the psychological states of the agent but values (factual entities). For Nagel, in case of moral 
reasons at least it seems that reasons are values of occurrences of some events and actions. So 
at least in the case of moral reasons, he does not seem to be saying that our reasons are our 
believings. Values are rather factual kind of entities. 
 
„When a person accepts a reason for doing something he attaches value to its occurrence, a value which is either 
intrinsic or instrumental.“ (Nagel 1978: 35)  
 
Nagel claims that reasons can be formulated as predicates. There is a reason for some act or 
event to occur, if the corresponding predicate applies to that act or event. If the predicate 
applies primarily to x-ing then it applies derivatively to any act which promotes x-ing. All 
such reasons for x-ing are prima facie reasons and it will also be possible to find prima facie 
reasons for not x-ing. (Nagel 1978: 47)  
For example, such a predicate could be ‘... is in the interest of the agent’. „We have a reason 
to promote any event, actual or possible, if it is tenselessly true that at the time of that event, a 
reason-predicate applies to it.“ (Nagel 1978: 48) If there is a reason to promote something at 
time t, then this is true tenselessly, not only at time t. Nagel admits that the conditions which 
determine a given reason are not timeless, however, the values which reasons embody are still 
timeless, and can transmit their influence from future to past, once it is clear that the reason 
will be present. (Nagel 78: 55) The timelessness of reasons is explained by the consistency of 
an agent’s identity over time. If my future reasons were no reasons for me now unless I had a 
desire to promote my future interests now, it would imply that I fail to identify with myself. 
Because of the persistence of the identity over time, all our reasons are tenseless reasons and 
the reasons for our future-selves are reasons for us now. If I have a reason to know how to 
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speak some Italian in six weeks, then I have a reason to study it now even if I have no desire 
to do so. The conception of oneself as a single individual over time makes our reasons 
timeless.  
Nagel understands altruism as willingness to act in the interest of other persons, without the 
need of ulterior motives such as benevolence, sympathy, love, redirected self-interest, etc. 
They can be the source for motivation but there is also pure altruism, that can motivate 
people. (Nagel 78: 80) As Nagel states, we might have an intuition that, 
 
 „since it is I who am acting, even when I act in the interests of another, it must be an interest of mine which 
provides the impulse. If so, any convincing justification of apparently altruistic behaviour must appeal to what I 
want. [---] (i.e.) my belief that an act of mine will benefit someone else can motivate me only because I want his 
good, or else want something which involves it.“ (Nagel 1978: 80 – 81)  
 
Nagel argues that desires to act in some way, that are necessarily present, must not be among 
conditions for the motivation but can be logical consequences of having reasons so to act, as 
shown before. He describes the structure of having reasons to act altruistically in the same 
way. The desire to act in the interests of others is rather a consequence of having a reason to 
act altruistically than a condition for altruistic actions. 
 
„In so far as a desire must be present if I am motivated to act in the interest of another, it need not be a desire of 
the sort which can form the basis for a motivation. It may, instead, be a desire which is itself motivated by 
reasons which the other person’s interests provide. And if that is so, it cannot be among the conditions for the 
presence of such reasons. Desire is not the only source of motivation. Therefore we may look for other internal 
factors which connect belief and action in the altruistic case.“ (Nagel 1978: 81) 
 
As I see it, Nagel’s treatment of prudence and altrusim makes it clear that Nagel’s theory of 
reasons cannot be purely psychologist. Instead it seems to be a mixed view (with a greater 
weight on factual reasons as I will argue in section 5). As I have shown in section 3.3 Nagel 
argues in his “Possibility of Altruism” that both beliefs and desires can sometimes be 
explained by something other than themselves and thus cannot be among the reasons why the 
agent acts. He argues that good moral reasons cannot be states of the agent, because one’s 
desires and beliefs are explained by one’s values. In this case agent’ s desires and beliefs exist 
as a consequence of having reasons.  
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4. Factualism 
  
4.1 Jonathan Dancy’s view and arguments 
 
 Jonathan Dancy defines reasons for human action in general as considerations in the light of 
which we act (Dancy 2000: 2). Those considerations are about contents of our beliefs (what is 
believed) and it must be some fact of the world that we consider as a reason to act in some 
way. Dancy argues that reasons for human action are not grounded in states of ourselves, 
whether desires or beliefs. He defends the realist view that, 
 
„our reasons are given us by how things are and what is of value, not by (relations to) our beliefs and our desires. 
[---] reality is practical in the sense that good reasons are not grounded in psychological states of the agent, but in 
how things in fact are. “ (Dancy 2003: 423) 
 
His view is that normative reasons are aspects of the situation, real features of things around 
us, and therefore motivating reasons must be at least capable of being the same sort of thing. 
(Dancy 2003: 425) Dancy distinguishes between motivating and good reasons but he does not 
see these as different sorts of reasons. We simply use one and the same notion of reason to 
answer two different kinds of questions: the question why the agent acted as she did and the 
question wether there was good reason for her so to act. Motivating reasons are the agent’s 
reasons (reasons why), these reasons explain the action in terms of what there is to say in 
favour of the action from the agent’s point of view. Normative reasons or good reasons 
(reasons for) make an action sensible, they justify an action. Sometimes we can have 
motivating reasons for an action while there are no good reasons for that action. If I have an 
urge to do something silly or irrational, there will be a motivating reason for me while it is not 
a good a reason because it doesn’t render my action sensible. 
Dancy’s argumentation as I understand it can be reconstructed as follows:  
(1) P’s reason to help Q (good reason) is that Q is in trouble.   
(2) P’s believing that Q is in trouble is not really a reason for P to help Q. 
(3) The reason why P actually helps Q (motivating reason) is that Q is in trouble, not a 
psychological attitude of P’s. 
 
„It seems to me, however, blatantly obvious that most of our moral duties are grounded in features of the 
situation, not in our beliefs about how things are. It is because she is in trouble that I ought to help her, not 
because I think that she is in trouble.“ (Dancy 2000: 52) and  
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„He believed that there was a rhinoceros before him, because there was one there; she believed that he needed 
her help because he did. So the reasons that favour an action can explain the reasons that explain the action.“ 
(Dancy 2000: 101) 
 
The reason to take a medicine is that I am ill and the medicine cures me. (Not that I want to be 
cured or believe to be cured by the medicine). The reason why I go to the theatre tonight is 
that a play is performed. (Not that I want to see the play or believe that the play is performed). 
 
„The believing, which of course occurs (though even this will be questioned), does not play the role of 
motivating reason; some other role must be found for it. Motivating reasons are what is believed; and some of 
the things believed are normative reasons as well.“ (Dancy 2000: 101) 
 
The crumbly cliff example 
Only rarely can our psychological states be our reasons. Dancy describes a crumbly cliff case 
Where the agent believes the cliff to be crumbly and his belief makes him nervous and 
therefore the nervousness caused by his belief makes it more likely that he might fall if he 
tried to climb it. So his believing is a reason why he should not climb the cliff regardless of 
the cliff’s actual crumbliness. Dancy admits that in such a case the agent’s belief really seems 
to be a reason for him to stay away from the crumbly cliff, but these circumstances are not 
common. And even then, the believing that the cliff is crumbly is not the reason, but the belief 
that the cliff is crumbly as a fact.  
 
Rational and causal explanations of actions 
Dancy also argues that all explanations can be given in terms of reasons. We can ask for 
reasons why the sun sets in the evening, although the sun itself cannot have any reasons for 
setting. This is something that in Nagel’s terms would be a cause rather than a reason. 
Likewise, according to Nagel when there is nothing that would make my action rational from 
my point of view, it is caused and cannot be explained in terms of reasons. 
While Nagel talks about causes that are not reasons, Dancy argues that causes are also 
explanatory and thus we can speak of them as reasons.  
 
„We need not always suppose that the reasons we offer in explanation of why the agent did what he did are 
among what we have been calling „the agent’s reasons“, or that the agent acted in the light of those reasons. 
Explaining in terms of the reasons that motivated the agent is a special case of explaining (giving the reason) 
why he acted as he did.“ (Dancy 2000: 131)  
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However, in case of human actions Dancy distinguishes between two sorts of explanations: 
rational and causal. The rational explanations explain actions by giving the agent’s reasons for 
acting, the considerations that favoured the action or were taken to favour the action. They 
show the rationality of the agent’s action. Causal explanation of an action is an explanation of 
a different sort, it explains the action in terms of psychological states but this explanation does 
not include the agent’s reasons for acting and it is not supposed to show the rationality of the 
action like the rational explanation does. (Dancy 2003: 489) 
What we are doing when we seem to give rational explanations of actions in terms of the 
agent’s desires and beliefs is something completely different from when we give explanations 
in terms of reasons. For Dancy, reference to the agent’s mental states does not explain the 
action in terms of the agent’s reasons. It might cite causally relevant factors. In any case, it is 
a reference to entities that are themselves explainable in terms of reasons (desires), or at most 
are enabling conditions for something to be the agent’s reason (if the fact that p was the 
agent’s reason, then obviously the agent must have believed or been otherwise aware that p). 
 
Why prefer factualism to psychologism 
Factualism is designed to meet the normative constraint: my reasons are facts just like normative 
reasons are facts and that is why my reasons can be normative reasons. Motivating reasons are 
things that are believed and some of the things believed are normative reasons. The reason why 
we should act can also be the reason why we do act. Dancy calls this view the normative 
story. The psychologistic pure cognitivism on the other hand is what he calls a three-part story 
because of the way it is supposed to meet the normative constraint. Dancy suggests that in the 
pure cognitivist view reasons that explain the action (beliefs) are themselves sometimes 
explained by the reasons that favour an action. In this case reasons why someone acts can be 
explained by reasons for acting. The three-part story states that normative reasons cannot 
explain actions directly but they can do so indirectly. (1) normative reasons are facts, (2) 
motivating reasons are beliefs, and explain action, (3) motivating reasons are sometimes 
explained by normative reasons, so sometimes normative reasons indirectly explain action. 
(Dancy 2000: 101) That way the explanatory constraint is met by appeal to transitivity of 
explanation. However the normative constraint requires that motivating reasons could be the 
kind of entities that are also capable of being among reasons that favour an action, so cannot 
be met by the three-part story. The good reasons cannot directly be the reasons why the agent 
acts. So it renders it impossible to perform an action for the reasons that make it right.  
(Dancy 2000: 103) Dancy agrees that our psychological states are (normally) not the kind of 
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things that could make our actions right or wrong. My subjective believings cannot (normally) 
be reasons that make some actions right and others wrong.  
Dancy argues that finally another argument that speaks in favour of factualism is that agents often 
see their reasons as facts and don’t conceive of them in terms of their own psychological attitudes. 
Even thought it could be true, this argument might be begging the question. 
If I am painting my wall and I am asked why I am doing so, I would say, according to Dancy, 
that the old paint was bleached and flaking off and not that I believe it was bleached. This is 
because normally my believing that the wall is dull is not among those things that I take into 
consideration when I am thinking about what to do. Therefore the reason appears to be not my 
believing but what I believe.  
 
Psychologist objection I: Ownership constraint 
We might find it natural to adopt a psychologistic formulation of reasons because for anyone 
who does not want to see the play, the fact that it is performed is no reason to go to the 
theatre. And so it raises the question how reasons conceived as facts can be said to belong to 
the person whose reasons they are without the need to refer to that person’s psychological 
states. If we did need the help of psychological states to show this, the full explanation would 
not consist of facts alone and the factualist theory would not work. 
 On the factualist view the reason why I take my umbrella when I am going outside is not that 
I believe it’s raining. Instead, I would say that I am taking my umbrella because it is raining. 
Yet, it may seem that this explanation is not telling the whole story. For someone else who is 
much more excited by rainfalls than I am, the fact that it is raining could be a reason to run 
out and dance in the rain. Perhaps in my case it was heavy rain in autumn while in this other 
person’s case it was a drizzle in summer and so on. It would seem that in either case it is true 
that it is a fact that is the reason for A-ing or B-ing, not my belief, but it seems that some of 
my beliefs and other facts determine whether it is indeed a reason for A-ing or whether it is a 
reason for B-ing. Dancy’s reply to this would be that facts are simply reasons for different 
actions for different people in different circumstances. Reasons themselves are the facts in the 
light of which I do something. According to Dancy the fact that it rains outside can be the fact 
in the light of which I am motivated to go outside (if I like rain), but for someone else the fact 
that it rains can be the reason why he decides to take his umbrella or stay inside. 
On the factualist view my believing is an enabling condition for having motivating reasons. A 
belief is what makes it possible for a reason to be my reason to act, if I am not aware of some 
fact that fact cannot be my reason to act, i.e. the reason that motivates me to do something. I 
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don’t paint my wall because I believe it needs a fresh coat of paint, but my believing it 
enables the fact that the wall needs a fresh layer of paint to be a reason why I paint it. So I can 
have normative reasons for doing something without being aware of having such reasons, but 
I cannot have motivating reasons without being aware of it. If I don’t believe that the wall 
needs to be painted although it does, then the fact that it actually does can be a reason for 
painting the wall, but it cannot explain why I paint the wall. It cannot be my reason for 
painting it. In this case I must have had a different reason for doing so, for example that I was 
asked to paint the wall (in which case my reason is the fact that I was asked to paint it not my 
believing it, even though surely I believe it if it is my reason). Yet even though the fact that 
the wall needs a new layer of paint can be a reason why I paint it only if I believe that it is the 
case that the wall needs a new layer of paint, it does not follow that my belief is a reason to do 
it. Instead my act of painting the wall can be explained as follows: 
(a) I have a reason to paint the wall (the fact that it needs a fresh layer of paint) 
(b) I have an enabling belief (which is not my reason) 
(c) and I am motivated by the reason (that the wall needs a fresh layer of paint), i.e. I am in 
the state of desiring to paint the wall which is explained by the reason I have. 
 
Psychologist objection II: non-occurring facts 
Another objection to factualism is that sometimes the facts believed do not occur and so they 
cannot be reasons for us. For example, I might have confused the dates and they are not 
performing a play tonight but I am going to the theatre because I believe they do. In this case 
it seems false to say that my reason for going to the theatre was the fact that they performed a 
play there. Dancy’s reply is that the fact does not actually have to occur to be a reason. A 
psychologist theory could claim that my reason for going to the theatre was my belief that the 
play was performed and my desire to see it (though they did not perform the play). Dancy 
would claim that my reason was „a fact as I believed“ and so my reason is not my believing 
but what I believe.  
 
„Still we can never deny that the agent believes that p, if we once explain his action by saying that he did it for 
the reason that p, as he supposes. Indeed, as I see it, the two sentences at issue: 
His reason for doing it was that p, as he supposed 
His reason for doing it was that he supposed that p 
entail each other. [---] his belief that p is an enabling condition for his acting for the reason that p.“ 
 (Dancy 2000: 130)  
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Dancy’s response can be criticized on the basis that these two sentences do not entail each 
other, after all. In the first sentence the reason for action is that ‘p, as I supposeʼ and in the 
second sentence the reason is that ‘I suppose that pʼ. For example, the reason for some action 
could be that ‘it rains, as I supposeʼ or that ‘I suppose that it rainsʼ. Dancy’s claim that the two 
sentences entail one another can be criticized by indicating that if I suppose that it is raining, 
it is still possible that in fact it is not raining but if it is raining and I suppose that it is raining 
then it is not possible that it is actually not raining. If the two sentences do not entail each 
other the objection against factualism still stands. The facts which are supposed to be an 
agent’s reasons, in cases where the agent is mistaken about the facts, do not obtain, so the 
agent cannot have acted for such a reason. 
The latter objection seems to assume that the sentence “His reason for taking his umbrella was 
that it rained, as he supposed” ought to be read as “His reason for taking his umbrella was that 
it was raining and he supposed that it was raining”. I disagree with this reading. As I 
understand it, on Dancy’s view the first sentence reads as something like: “His reason for 
taking the umbrella was what he supposed and what he supposed was that it was raining“, i.e. 
Dancy’s  ‘p, as I supposeʼ does not entail that p is the case. 
It is possible that what the agent supposes is that it rains and it does not rain, so the sentences 
can entail one another. What is supposed in this case  refers to a non-obtaining states of affairs 
but Dancy argues that what we believe (the content of beliefs) is always the same sort of 
metaphysical 'beast', whether our beliefs are true or not: ‘that p’, in ‘I believe that p’, always 
refers to a state of affairs which is a factual entity.  
  
 
 4.2 Michael Smith’s Humean view and objections to factualism 
 
Michael Smith defends a Humean picture and objects separately to pure cognitivism and 
factualism. Smith interprets the argument of pure cognitivism as follows: „The belief that 
(say) something is desirable together with a belief about how to bring that desirable thing 
about can be what explains my action“ (M. Smith 2003: 461). Smith argues that beliefs might 
rationally explain desires, but this does not indicate that they motivate those desires (Smith 
2003: 462).  
As I pointed out in the section on pure cognitivism, Dancy rejects this criticism by claiming 
that he does not believe that the relation between beliefs and desires could be motivation. In 
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Dancy’s view desire is the state of being motivated and it cannot be motivated itself. Belief is 
one’s reason for being in the state of motivatedness, that is to desire, but it does not motivate 
one to be motivated. Dancy points out that it is even quite hard to understand what this could 
mean. As I understand pure cognitivism, he argues that beliefs motivate the action and to be 
motivated to act is to desire to act, beliefs explain why I desire to act and that is the same as to 
say that beliefs explain why one is motivated to act, and consequently why one acts. But this 
is so if pure cognitivism were true, which Dancy eventually rejects. In the end, Dancy denies 
that beliefs could be reasons either and argues that motivation is a relation that can occur 
between an agent and a consideration. Facts about the world are reasons that motivate us to 
act (while beliefs enable those facts to be reasons for us without being reasons themselves and 
desire is the state of being motivated by those considerations which is not a reason itself). 
Smith continues by arguing that even if it were not the case that beliefs could be explanatory 
in the motivating sense (a view which Dancy argues that he does not want nor need to support 
as shown above), there are other reasons for rejecting Dancy’s view.  
Remember that for pure cognitivism, desires must themselves be explained by some 
appropriate pair of beliefs, or the action does not make rational sense. Thus desires cannot 
explain action, since they need to be explained as much as action does. Smith objects to this 
view. He claims that an action is always done for reasons (or otherwise it is not an intentional 
action but simply a happening). If we want to consider a doing that is motivated by 
inexplicable desires to be an action, there must be a reason and this reason, according to 
Smith, can only be a Humean belief-desire pair, for it is the only possible explanation left.  
As Dancy has admitted himself, not all desires are motivated by beliefs, sometimes we simply 
find ourselves in such states, so if we want to explain actions motivated by these unexplicable 
states, desires must be reasons themselves in Smith’s view.  
In his reply to Smith Dancy suggests that actions which are not motivated by beliefs, which 
we just desire to do, i.e., we are just motivated to do, are rather reactions than actions, indeed. 
(Dancy 2003: 485) He sees nothing wrong in restricting what counts as action and argues that 
Humeans do it as well – for example when one stretches, she might do it almost 
unconsciously without any beliefs and only with a desire at best. In this case she does not 
seem to be acting for a reason in Humean terms either and Humeanism is also a ʻconstitutiveʼ 
account of explanation of action, so anything that cannot be explained with the Humean 
model would not count as an action. (Dancy 2003: 484-485) 
The third objection Smith makes is directed at Dancy’s factualism and reasons understood as 
considerations. Smith refers to Dancy’s crumbly cliff example and claims that Dancy is, 
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indeed, right that it is very rare that our considerations about our psychological states are the 
considerations that motivate us. Accordingly, if we adopt Dancy’s view, the Davidsonian 
theory of motivating reasons appears to be committed to the claim that agents prevalently face 
circumstances that are relevantly similar to the example of the crumbly cliff. This does not 
seem likely in Dancy’s view and therefore if we have accepted Dancy’s definition of reasons, 
we should abandon  a Davidsonian understanding of reasons. But Smith claims that the 
problem arises only if we accept Dancy’s understanding of reasons as considerations. Smith 
argues that, 
 
„Sometimes as when (say) we ask for the reason why the bridge collapsed, we use the term ʻreasonʼ to pick out 
not a consideration, but a state, specifically a state that figures in a suitable explanation, generally a causal 
explanation, of the occurrence in question. An alternative reading of the truism that we always act for reasons 
would thus be following: whenever an agent acts there is always some description of what he does under which 
what he does can be seen to be suitably explained, perhaps causally explained, by a particular kind of state.“ 
(Smith 2003: 465)  
 
For each action there can be given some description under which the agent’s action can be 
explained, perhaps causally, by a state (in case of actions the psychological state the agent is 
in). He concludes that if we adopt this view, Dancy’s argument will collapse because the 
claim that the considerations that motivate us are not considerations about our own 
psychological states is simply irrelevant to the identification of motivating reasons with 
psychological states. (Smith 2003: 466) 
Dancy’s reply is that if psychologism is to be rejected as a theory of motivating reasons, it 
ceases to be a theory of motivation. If the question is not about what motivated the agent to 
act, it remains vague what other kind of explanation it should offer or what question this 
description can give an answer to. According to Dancy beliefs could only play the causal role, 
if they represent the light in which the agent acted and if we accept this view, then we are 
back in the reasons-explanation whether we want it or not. (Dancy 2000: 169) 
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5. Factualism as the most plausible account of reasons 
 
5.1 Dancy’s explicable desires and Nagel’s motivated desires 
 
I believe that the previously considered discussion has shown that we should disregard desire- 
based view of reasons. The main argument against desire being what (always) motivates is 
that desires themselves can be explained. We are left with two competing theories that both 
accept this much. In Dancy’s view desires are always simply states of being motivated and the 
state of being motivated is exactly what needs to be explained when we explain actions in 
terms of reasons. Nagel has also defended the view that desires cannot always be our reasons: 
in cases where they can be explained by something else, they don’t do the explaining but need 
to be explained. Nagel defends the view that unmotivated desires, however, count as 
motivating reasons. For Dancy there are no such things as motivated desires, motivatedness 
cannot be motivated. Dancy argues that if the agent has a desire which cannot be explained by 
any considerations in the light of which she would see so acting desirable, her action simply 
cannot be explained by reasons. We could say that while Nagel talks about motivated and 
unmotivated desires, Dancy talks about explicable desires and inexplicable desires. Nagel’s 
unmotivated desires are essentially the same kind of entities as Dancy’s inexplicable desires 
and Nagel’s motivated desires are explicable, too, but Nagel believes (differently from 
Dancy) that they are explained by appeal to motivational relations between beliefs and 
desires. Dancy argues that the explanations we can give for having desires are not of 
motivational nature. In my opinion, Nagel’s theory would not suffer much if it would drop the 
motivational nature of explanations. As shown above his motivated desires and unmotivated 
desires are compatible with Dancy’s explicable and inexplicable desires. The burden of 
argumentation seems to lie on Nagel, though, if he wants to insist that these relations are 
motivational. However, Nagel’s theory accepts that sometimes desire is present without being 
the reason (and so can beliefs be present without being the reason). I think that Dancy is right 
in questioning the claim that sometimes beliefs and desires as states that the agent is in are 
reasons while in case of normative reasons, they are not. Nagel argues that desires and beliefs 
are not always our reasons, but he does insist that sometimes they are. He argues that 
normative reasons are values as shown in section 3.4. When he introduces unmotivated and 
motivated desires, he does, indeed, seem to agree that psychological states can be motivating 
reasons if there is nothing further that explains them. An unmotivated desire can be a 
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motivating reason, and a belief can sometimes be my motivating reason when it explains the 
desires I have. However, Nagel has also argued that whenever our belief that p and having the 
belief that p is explained by something further, it cannot be the reason for action. It seems to 
me, that in case of motivating reasons, too, Nagel could agree that some of our reasons are 
facts that explain our beliefs which in turn bring about our desires. In my reading a significant 
amount of all motivating reasons I have must also be factual. Yet, because Nagel does not 
deny that sometimes our beliefs and desires can be reasons (if they cannot be explained by 
something else), his view is a mixed view. In my reading of Nagel facts should be our reasons 
more often than our psychological states: normative reasons are always facts and motivating 
reasons can be facts. 
Dancy rejects the view that even some desires or beliefs are reasons because he does not want 
to accept that reasons can be different sorts of entities and we could sometimes act because of 
one kind of entities (desires, beliefs) and other times because of different kind of entities 
(values, facts). Dancy has admitted rare cases where the agent’s reasons are her mental states 
(like in the crumbly cliff example), but only regarded as facts among others. In such cases the 
reason is the fact that I believe that the cliff is crumbly, not the state of believing this. 
What Dancy and Nagel fight against is the idea that reality is not practical, that it is one’s 
‘perspective’ (desires or beliefs) that only makes sense of our acting for reasons, that acting 
for reasons is a fundamentally self-referential thing. 
 
 
5.2 The premises of the factualist view 
 
I believe that perhaps the most interesting objection made to Dancy’s view is that it depends 
on its definition of reasons as considerations in the light of which the agent acts. 
Dancy’s position relies on two central premises: (a) reasons are considerations in the light of 
which we act and (b) desire is the state of being motivated (and it makes no sense to speak of 
motivating motivatedness). I have shown in my thesis that considerations are about facts and, 
thus, if we adopt (a) it seems very difficult (if possible at all) to deny the conclusion that so 
are reasons for actions. If we adopt (b) we must abandon Nagel’s position, because there can 
be no such thing as motivated desires. Therefore, if we accept (a) and (b), Dancy’s factualism 
seems to be the best account of reasons and if one wants to attack Dancy’s view, I believe he 
or she would have to show why either of these premises should be rejected. Therefore, as 
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Nagel has to reject (b) when he speaks of unmotivated and motivated desires and (a) when he 
argues that unmotivated desires and beliefs (instead of what is believed) can sometimes be 
reasons, the burden of argument lies on him. However, I will go on to argue within Dancy’s 
outline of what reasons are that our own mental states as facts can be our reasons for acting 
more often than Dancy seems to allow. 
 
 
5.3 In what sense can agent’s mental states be her reasons 
in the factualist framework? 
 
If I see no reason to paint the walls of my room but desire to paint it nonetheless, then the 
desire to paint my room is inexplicable and so would be my painting it, as Dancy argues. I am 
in an inexplicable state of wanting to paint the walls. However, if I decide to paint it, then I 
think it could be said that my being motivated to paint the walls was the consideration in the 
light of which I decided to actually paint it. Because I do it in the light of just wanting to paint 
a wall, my reason is the fact that ‘I want to paint a wall’. If I am an autonomous person who 
can resist her own desires, surely I could have decided not to paint the wall because there was 
no other reason but my wanting to paint it. If I decide to do it nevertheless, it is because I have 
considered the fact that I want to paint the wall as a sufficient reason to paint it. If the agent is 
unable to resist her desire or yen, she is caused to act and since it is not a rational action there 
can be no agent’s reason for acting. 
If such case makes sense, is Dancy’s theory compatible with it? For example I may be reading 
a book that I have read many times before simply because I enjoy it so much. So I might 
explain why I am reading it by saying,“Well, I really like this book.” Liking a book is a 
psychological state and it is also a good reason to do something. So it follows that my own 
temperament can be my reason to do something. I think it would not be accurate to say that in 
cases like these my reason is just the fact that it is an interesting book or a good book. I think 
it’s more plausible to say that in cases like these at least one of my reasons to read the book is 
a fact about myself and my psychological states.     
If what I have suggested is true, then Dancy’s model could also regard inexplicably motivated 
doings as action, provided that such mental states are regarded as facts among other facts in 
the light of which the agent can act, rather than enjoying some special status in the 
explanation of action. It could be that there are simply two kinds of considerations in the light 
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of which we act – those about facts of the outside world and those about our own 
psychological states. I suppose that it is not so uncommon for people to see their own 
psychological states as reasons in the light of which they act. Especially when the reason is 
some subjective fact, e.g. ‘this orange tastes good’ or ‘reading is enjoyable’ we can consider 
our own mental states and feelings as reasons in the light of which we should do something. 
  
    
5.4 The agent’s reasons and reasons why they are reasons for the agent 
 
One of Dancy’s main arguments, as I see it, is that motivating reasons are something that the 
agents themselves would have to say about their actions. If the agent paints the wall, the 
reason why she does it, is not explained in terms of reasons someone else can see, but what 
the agent can see. So the agent’s explanation why she paints the wall would be something 
factual like, “the wall looked dull and faded before”. The view meets the ownership 
constraint by appeal to beliefs as enabling conditions for reasons to belong to the agent. A 
fact can be a reason the agent has because she also has an enabling belief that the fact 
obtains. But the belief itself is normally not the reason for the agent so to act.  
The enabling role of a belief is something that could be reformulated as a reason of a 
different sort. I am able to speak because my vocal chords enable me to, i.e. the reason why I 
can speak is that I have vocal chords. So the reason why I can have motivating reasons is that 
I also have beliefs. We can distinguish between the agent’s reasons and the reasons why the 
agent can have the reasons she has. Facts alone do not do the job when we want to explain an 
action. 
I agree with Smith in that when we talk about reasons we do not always have considerations 
in mind but I think that it is important to stress that usually, when we talk about beliefs and 
desires as reasons we see them as reasons why the agent could have agent’s reasons, they 
explain how reasons are the agent’s reasons. They are not reasons for which we act but 
reasons why we can have reasons to act. As shown in chapter 4.1 Dancy seems to accept the 
view that not all reasons are agent’s reasons, and for instance causes can also be reasons in the 
sense that they are explanatory. He argues that rational reasons in the light of which agents act 
is just one form of reasons, the sort that explain actions. So in the sense that beliefs explain 
how facts can be reasons for the agent, without being the agent’s reasons they are still reasons 
why the agent was able to respond to facts of the world. The psychologistic objection about 
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the ownership constraint points out an important link between the roles of psychological states 
– they show that we cannot give a full of explanation of how factual reasons could become the 
agent’s reasons without any appeal to that agent’s psychological states. Dancy agrees that 
beliefs must be present but not as agent’s reasons.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
In my thesis I have analyzed how human actions can be explained in terms of reasons. I have 
discussed the psychologist view that reasons are agent’s mental states, such as desires and 
beliefs, and the factualist view that reasons are facts of the world. 
I examined the desire-based account of reasons according to which both motivating reasons 
and normative reasons are desire-belief pairs where desire is always a more basic component 
as beliefs alone are inert states and cannot be reasons for actions. I argued for the position that 
this view is deficient because usually agents have reasons for desiring something and, thus, 
their desires need to be explained in terms of reasons and cannot be among these reasons. I 
continued by analyzing the belief-alone model of reasons. In this view desires are never 
reasons and only beliefs can explain our actions in terms of reasons. We have two beliefs 
which together are capable of motivating and explain our actions: a belief about how things 
are and a belief about how things would be if the action were successfully performed. Desire 
is present whenever we are motivated to act, yet not among reasons but as a conclusion of 
having reasons to act. Reasons make sense of desiring something. 
Both models, the desire-based model and the belief-alone model, are unificationist models: 
motivating reasons and good reasons are always the same kind of entities. Next I examined 
Nagel’s view, which I interpreted as a hybrid view of factualism and psychologism. In my 
reading, Nagel argues that normative reasons are always facts and motivating reasons are 
sometimes mental states (unmotivated desires or beliefs) and sometimes facts in the light of 
which the agent has come to have her desires and beliefs.  
Finally I discussed the factualist view that reasons are facts in the world and in rare cases our 
mental states can be facts in the light of which we act, but the states of believing or desiring 
are never reasons. I argued that if we accept Dancy’s two premises about reasons: first that 
they are considerations in the light of which we act, and second that desire is the state of being 
motivated which itself cannot be motivated by anything else, factualism appears to be the best 
account of reasons. If we adopt these premises, we should consequently accept that desires 
cannot explain actions but need to be explained and that considerations are about facts, and 
therefore both motivating and normative reasons should also be. I argued that if we should 
find reasons why either of these premises is incorrect, the factualist theory might need to be 
reconsidered, otherwise, however, it seems to give a plausible account of reasons. I also 
argued that Nagel’s view is substantially close to factualism as it defends the view that reality 
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can be practical and our reasons (at least normative reasons) can be facts. Nagel however 
speaks of beliefs and unmotivated desires as sometimes being our reasons, which requires him 
to reject that desires cannot be motivated and that reasons are always considerations. This lays 
the burden of argument on Nagel. 
Dancy has been criticized for detaching reasons from agents to whom they belong. If reasons 
are facts in the world, it may seem impossible to explain how they can belong to agents. 
However, beliefs play exactly the role of enabling facts to be our reasons in Dancy’s picture. I 
could not have a reason p to do q, unless I had the belief that p. Thus, beliefs are not the 
agent’s reasons (apart from the rare cases when she acts in the light of the fact that she is in a 
certain mental state, her belief and not her believing). Yet, beliefs are reasons why agents can 
have reasons to act.  
 Dancy’s view has also been objected to for allowing agents to act without reasons when they 
act intentionally but without being able to come up with any reasons why they are motivated 
to act as they do. Dancy accepts this and says that in this case their actions are, indeed, 
inexplicable in terms of reasons (because there simply are no facts in the light of which the 
agent acts and thus no reasons). I argued that in my reading Dancy can allow some 
inexplicable desires (as facts) to be reasons like he allows some beliefs (as facts) to be our 
reasons. For example, I might decide to go for a walk in the light of the fact that I have an 
inexplicable desire to have a walk. I also defended the view that sometimes, and more often 
than Dancy seems to allow, our own psychological states are the facts in the light of which we 
act. For example, I might read the same book for several times in the light of the fact that I 
like reading it. 
In conclusion, I have defended the factualist account of reasons against psychologist accounts 
of reasons. I have shown that reasons should be understood as facts and that mental states are 
still included in the explanation of action but not as agent’s reasons but as enabling conditions 
for having agent’s reasons. Finally I have argued that our mental states can be the facts in the 
light of which we act in Dancy’s framework more often than he seems to claim they are. 
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Kas tegude põhjused on toimija vaimsed seisundid või faktid? 
 
 
Enamik inimeste tegusid on seletatavad põhjustega. Et seletada, miks ma midagi tegin, saan 
ma tavaliselt välja tuua põhjused, mis rääkisid mu teo kasuks selle teo sooritamise ajal. 
Sellised põhjused on minu motiveerivad põhjused. Lisaks saab rääkida põhjustest, miks ma 
midagi tegema peaksin, ehk normatiivsetest või headest põhjustest. Motiveerivad ja 
normatiivsed põhjused peaksid omavahel olema selliselt seotud, et põhjused millegi 
tegemiseks võiksid saada põhjusteks, miks ma tegelikult midagi teen. 
 Oma väitekirjas uurin, mida tähendab põhjusega toimimine ja millised entiteedid on 
põhjused. Praegune keskne vaidlus põhjuste olemuse osas toimub psühholoogilise põhjuste 
käsituse ja faktilise põhjuste käsituse vahel. Esimese vaate järgi on põhjused toimija 
psühholoogilised seisundid (nagu soovid ja uskumused) ja teise vaate järgi faktid maailmas. 
Et lühidalt nende kahe positsiooni erinevust illustreerida, kujutlegem olukorda, kus ma 
otsustan värvida üle oma toa seinad. Psühholoogilise põhjuste käsituse järgi saaks minu 
põhjus seda teha olla kas minu vaimne seisund või vaimsete seisundite kombinatsioon. Ma 
võin näiteks tahta värskelt värvitud tuba ja uskuda, et teatud teod, nagu värvi ostmine ja seinte 
värvimine, aitavad mul soovitut saada. Seljuhul on põhjuseks seinu värvida minu soov ja 
minu uskumus selle kohta, kuidas soovitut saavutada. Niisugune on on näiteks niinimetatud 
Hume’ilik vaade, mis pole tingimata vaade, mida Hume pooldas, kuid on tõlgendus ja/või 
arendus tema motivatsiooni analüüsist. Selle vaate järgi on soovidel põhjuses alati 
fundamentaalsem roll kui uskumustel. Minu uskumused üksi on jõuetud – näiteks minu 
uskumus, et raamatute lugemine on hariv, saab olla põhjuseks raamatuid lugeda ainult siis, 
kui mul juba on soov end harida. 
Teine psühholoogiline vaade tegudest võiks olla, et mul on uskumus, et mu toa seinad vajavad 
uut värvikorda ja minu uskumus tekitab minus soovi seinu värvida. Kui soovipõhisets 
teooriates on põhjuses fundamentaalsem roll minu soovil, siis uskumusepõhistes mudelites on 
minu uskumus see, mis muudab mõistlikuks soovida seinu värvida. Seega on niisuguse vaate 
järgi uskumus põhjuses fundamentaalsemas rollis (nt Nagel’i järgi on mõnede tegude 
põhjuseks uskumused, sest nendega on seletatavad meie motiveeritud soovid) või on 
uskumused üksi teo põhjused (puhta kognitivismi järgi, kus soovimine on mõistetud 
motiveeritud olekuna, mis ise pole kunagi põhjus, vaid on alati seletatav uskumuste kui 
põhjustega). 
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Faktilise põhjuste käsituse järgi pole põhjuseks ei minu soov ega minu uskumus, vaid fakt, et 
mu toa sein on luitunud ja vajab uut värvikorda. Viimase vaate järgi on põhjused kaalutlused, 
mille valgel toimija otsustab midagi teha. Kuna enamasti me ei arvesta põhjusena midagi teha 
iseenda uskumist, vaid seda, mida me usume, siis ei ole selle vaate järgi vaimsed seisundid 
toimija tegude põhjuseks. 
Ma näitan oma väitekirjas, et soovipõhised teooriad on puudulikud, kuna toimija soovid on 
enamasti ise seletatavad uskumustega. Seetõttu ei piisa tegude seletamiseks toimija soovidele 
osutamisest, vaid teo seletamiseks on vajalik seletada, miks toimija soovis vastavalt toimida. 
Seejärel analüüsin ma ainult uskumustel põhinevat põhjuste teooriat ehk puhast kognitivismi, 
mille järgi soov ei ole kunagi osa põhjusest, vaid põhjus moodustub kaht tüüpi uskumustest: 
uskumustest selle kohta, kuidas asjad on, ja uskumustest selle kohta, kuidas need oleksid 
pärast mingi teo sooritamist. Näiteks on mul uskumused, et praegu on mu toa seinad luitunud 
ja uskumus, et mulle ei meeldi nende luitunud värv (uskumused selle kohta, kuidas asjad on) 
ning peale selle uskumus, et pärast seinte värvimist pole seinad enam tuhmid ja mu tuba näeb 
parem välja (uskumused selle kohta, kuidas asjad oleksid). Need uskumused koos muudavad 
mõistlikuks soovida värvida toa seinad üle. Nii soovidepõhise kui uskumustepõhise vaate 
põhjal on motiveerivad põhjused ja normatiivsed põhjused üht sorti entiteedid. 
 Järgmiseks uurisin ma Thomas Nagel’i vaadet, mida ma tõlgendan kui faktilise ja 
psühholoogilise käsitluse hübriidi, kus normatiivsed ja motiveerivad põhjused ei ole alati 
sama tüüpi entiteedid. Minu lugemisest lähtuvalt väidab Nagel, et normatiivsed põhjused on 
alati faktid (väärtused) ja motiveerivad põhjused on mõnikord toimija vaimsed seisundid 
(tema motiveerimata soovid ja tema uskumused) ja mõnikord faktid, mille valguses toimija on 
omandanud oma uskumused ja soovid.  
Viimaks analüüsin ma faktilist põhjuste käsitust, mille järgi põhjused on alati faktid 
maailmas, mitte aga mõnes vaimses seisundis viibimine. Kuna selle vaate järgi on nii 
motiveerivad kui normatiivsed põhjused ühtviisi faktid, siis seletab see, kuidas põhjused, miks 
me midagi tegema peaksime (näiteks moraalsed põhjused), saavad saada põhjusteks, miks me 
tegelikult midagi teeme. Selle vaate kohaselt võivad erandlikel juhtudel olla meie tegude 
põhjusteks ka meie vaimsed seisundid, aga üksnes faktidena, mille valgel me otsustame 
midagi teha. Näiteks kui ma usun, et Eesti Post jälgib iga mu liigutust, ilma et mul oleks 
selleks mingeid tõendeid, siis ei ole see, mida ma usun, tõenäoliselt põhjus varjuda postiljoni 
eest, vaid pigem on fakt, et ma seda usun, põhjus, mille valgel ma peaksin otsima 
psühholoogilist nõustamist.  
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Ma kaitsen oma töös vaadet, et kui me võtame omaks Dancy kaks eeldust põhjuste kohta: 
esiteks, et need on kaalutlused, mille valgel me tegutseme, ja teiseks, et millegi soovimine on 
sama, mis olla motiveeritud ning ei saa seega ise millegi poolt motiveeritud olla, siis osutub 
faktiline põhjuste käsitus parimaks põhjuste seletuseks. Ma väitsin, et kui me leiame põhjuse, 
miks kumbki neist eeldustest osutub valeks, siis on ilmselt vajalik ka faktilist käsitust uuesti 
läbi vaadata. Kui me aga võtame omaks need eeldused, siis näib, et faktiline põhjuste käsitus 
pakub usutava seletuse sellest, millised entiteedid on põhjused. Ma väidan oma teesis samuti, 
et Nagel’i teooria on sisuliselt lähedane faktilisele põhjuste käsitusele, kuna kaitseb arusaama, 
et reaalsus võib olla praktiline, teisisõnu, et meie põhjused (või vähemalt normatiivsed 
põhjused) võivad olla faktid. Nagel väidab aga, et leidub ka motiveerimata soove kui 
põhjuseid ja motiveeritud soove, mispuhul vähemalt mõnikord on meie tegude põhjusteks 
uskumused. Seega peab Nagel tagasi lükkama mõlemad Dancy eeldused, nii tema väite, et 
soovid ei saa olla motiveeritud kui ka, et põhjused on alati kaalutlused. See seab 
argumenteerimiskoorma Nagel’ile. 
Dancy’le on ette heidetud, et tema teooria lahutab põhjused toimijatest, kellele nad kuuluvad. 
Kui põhjused on faktid maailmas, võib tunduda võimatu näidata, kuidas nad inimestele 
kuuluvad. Dancy vaate järgi aga ongi uskumused need, mis võimaldavad põhjustel olla minu 
põhjused. Mul ei saaks olla põhjust p teha q, kui mul poleks uskumust, et p. Niisiis pole 
uskumused toimija põhjused (välja arvatud harvad juhused, kui need on faktid, mille valgel 
me otsustame midagi teha). Uskumused on seega põhjused, miks mul saavad olla 
motiveerivad põhjused. (Normatiivsed põhjused saavad mul muidugi olla, ilma et ma neist 
teadlik oleksin). 
Dancy’it on kritiseeritud ka selle eest, et tema vaate kohaselt võivad inimesed 
intentsionaalselt tegutseda, ilma et nende tegevust saaks põhjustega seletada. Kui ma ei oska 
esitada ühtki põhjust, mille pärast ma tegin, mida ma tegin, peale selle, et ma lihtsalt tahtsin 
seda teha, siis peab Dancy vaate kohaselt ütlema, et mu teol polnud põhjust. Dancy nõustub 
sellega ja ütleb, et seljuhul ei olegi tegu toimija põhjustega seletatav. Oma teesis väidan ma, et 
Dancy teooria raamistik lubab tegelikult ka selliste tegude puhul rääkida põhjustest, sest 
mõnikord võivad meie enda soovid olla faktid, mille valgel me otsustame midagi teha. Minu 
seletamatu soov minna jalutama võib olla fakt, mille valgel ma otsustangi jalutuskäigu teha. 
Ma jätkan väitega, et kui ma loen mitmendat korda sama raamatut lihtsalt sellepärast, et ma 
naudin selle lugemist, võin ma oma tegu seletada, öeldes et: „Mulle väga meeldib see 
raamat.“ Meeldimine on aga vaimne seisund ja hea põhjus millegi tegemiseks. Sellest 
järeldub, et minu enda meeleolu võib olla põhjus, mille valgel ma midagi teha otsustan. 
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Väidan, et sellistel juhtudel poleks õige öelda, et mu põhjuseks oli üksnes fakt, et see on 
huvitav raamat või hea raamat. Usutavam on, et sarnastes olukordades on vähemalt üks mu 
põhjustest, mille valgel ma toimin, fakt minu enda ja minu vaimsete seisundite kohta. 
Kokkuvõttes, kaitsen oma väitekirjas faktilist põhjuste käsitust psühholoogiliste põhjuse- 
teooriate vastu. Näitan, et põhjuseid tuleks mõista kui fakte, ja et toimija mõnes vaimses 
seisundis olemine  kuulub tegude seletusse, kuid mitte põhjuse, vaid motiveerivate põhjuste 
omamist võimaldava seisundina. Lõpuks väidan ma, et faktiline põhjuste käsitus lubab, et 
meie vaimsed seisundid võivad faktidena olla meie tegude põhjused.  
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